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Abstract
Orang-utans played a communication game in two studies testing their ability to produce
and comprehend requestive pointing. While the ‘communicator’ could see but not obtain
hidden food, the ‘donor’ could release the food to the communicator, but could not see its lo-
cation for herself. They could coordinate successfully if the communicator pointed to the
food, and if the donor comprehended his communicative goal and responded pro-socially.
In Study 1, one orang-utan pointed regularly and accurately for peers. However, they re-
sponded only rarely. In Study 2, a human experimenter played the communicator’s role in
three conditions, testing the apes’ comprehension of points of different heights and different
degrees of ostension. There was no effect of condition. However, across conditions one
donor performed well individually, and as a group orang-utans’ comprehension perfor-
mance tended towards significance. We explain this on the grounds that comprehension re-
quired inferences that they found difficult – but not impossible. The finding has valuable
implications for our thinking about the development of pointing in phylogeny.
Introduction
Pointing is a form of intentional, referential communication that has been hypothesised to play
a foundational role in human communicative and cognitive development [1]. By enabling
communicators to coordinate their behaviour with respect to a distal feature of the environ-
ment, it can facilitate numerous activities that are central to the development of human cul-
ture–including language acquisition and pedagogy. It was likely also fundamental in enabling
our early hominin ancestors to engage in the large game hunting that supported an increasingly
carnivorous diet and which, in turn, supported further cognitive growth [2]. However, pointing
is widely recognised to be cognitively challenging [1] [3]. For coordination to be possible, the
recipient of a point must be able to make potentially difficult inferences about her interlocutor’s
communicative goal–both identifying the referent of the point (the ‘referential intention’), and
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goal the with which the communicator sought to direct that referent to her attention (the ‘so-
cial intention’). For this reason, it is often argued that the cognitive abilities that enabled point-
ing production and comprehension in humans are not widely shared by other species [1] [4].
A robust finding has been that children as young as twelve months excel at both producing
and comprehending points [5] [6] [7]. However, while captive apes (those living in zoos and
sanctuaries but not hand-reared by humans) sometimes start to point in interaction with hu-
mans, their pointing comprehension–where this is operationalised just as an ability to respond
appropriately to others’ points (for example, by using an experimenter’s point to locate hidden
food)–is comparatively poor [8] [9] [10]. Furthermore, there is little evidence that apes point
for one another in the wild (although see [11] [12] [13]).
In interactions with humans, captive apes have been shown to point to make requests–for
example, for food, or for tools that will enable them to get food [14] [15] [16]. However, the
motivations with which they point are characteristically different from human points. While
children point both for the benefit of others and as a means of making requests, apes point
only rarely when they do not stand to gain themselves [17]. Furthermore, while infants of 12
months point both distally and for objects that they could acquire themselves, apes tend to
point only for objects that they cannot obtain, and only after approaching them [18].
With respect to comprehension, apes typically fare unspectacularly. While children as
young as 12 months [5] and even domestic dogs [19] are reliably able to use an experimenter's
point to locate hidden food, chimpanzees regularly succeed in this task only at chance [8] [9]
[10]–despite being highly motivated. While fewer studies have been conducted on apes’ com-
prehension of requestive points, chimpanzees have been shown to perform no better than
chance when a human experimenter pointed to request from them one of two random objects
[20], and all species of non-human great ape performed poorly in a task testing their compre-
hension of a third party’s requestive point [21].
While some chimpanzees, bonobos, and orang-utans have been shown to perform well in
tasks testing their comprehension of informative pointing [14] [22], individuals in these studies
were often hand-reared by humans, and so exposed to humans–and human forms of commu-
nication–in ways that their peers were not. Moreover, in these studies (e.g., [22]) points were
often produced much closer to the targets than in studies with more negative findings. These
results suggest that with an upbringing not typical of zoo apes, and a slightly easier experimen-
tal setup, apes can be brought to comprehend the points of human interlocutors. This may be
because ontogeny plays a foundational role in the development of pointing comprehension
abilities in both human and ape subjects, such that when apes are reared in conditions compa-
rable to human children, they acquire skills needed for comprehension that they would other-
wise lack [23]. Yet even in such cases of enculturation, there is little evidence of apes
spontaneously incorporating pointing gestures into their interactions with one another. In this
respect, they differ from human children, who have been observed to point for one another at
12-months [24].
Against this background, a valuable finding was made by Pelé et al. [25], when they reported
the spontaneous use of a pointing gesture between conspecifics in populations of captive chim-
panzees, bonobos, and orang-utans at Leipzig zoo. In a token-exchange task all species of great
ape were trained to exchange different sets of tokens for food. Pairs of conspecifics were then
each given a set of tokens containing some that were valuable to themselves, some that were
valuable to a partner, and some that were valuable to neither; and they were given the opportu-
nity to exchange tokens with one another. During exchanges, chimpanzees, bonobos, and
orang-utans (but not gorillas) all spontaneously used points as a means of requesting from
their conspecifics the tokens that they desired. One individual in particular—Bimbo, a nursery-
reared adult flanged male orang-utan–was observed to point for other orang-utans frequently.
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Furthermore, his conspecifics responded appropriately to these points. When Bimbo produced
ambiguous begging gestures, he received the tokens he required only at chance levels. By con-
trast, when he pointed to the tokens that he needed, he received them significantly more often
than would be predicted by chance.
While this finding is highly suggestive, a weakness of the used methodology limits what we
can infer about the strategies that the orang-utans in this study used to interpret the communi-
cative goals with which Bimbo had pointed. In particular, all females may have had prior
knowledge of what it was that Bimbo wanted, because they had previously seen him exchang-
ing the tokens to which he was pointing for food. This suggests a way in which they might per-
form well on the task without really understanding that Bimbo wanted the object to which he
pointed (that is, without grasping the referential intention of his point). One possibility consis-
tent with this is that females did not, in fact, differentiate at all between the pointing and beg-
ging gestures Bimbo produced. In both conditions they grasped that he wanted something
without knowing what he wanted. However, when Bimbo’s points directed their attention to a
subset of tokens, the females may simply have been reminded of his pre-existing preference.
This prior knowledge would then give them reason to hand these tokens over. By contrast,
when the begging gestures failed to direct their attention to any subset of tokens, they were not
reminded of his pre-existing desire; and the females just guessed at what he might want. Were
this the case, then Bimbo’s interlocutors would not have inferred the content of his request by
grasping that his point indicated that tokens to which he pointed. Rather, they responded ap-
propriately because they already knew what he wanted. Had they been ignorant of what he
wanted, such that they could not infer his desire from seeing the object that he desired, they
may not have been so successful in interpreting his points.
To test the flexibility of the same orang-utans’ comprehension of pointing–and so to better
understand the sorts of inference that they can make in communicative interaction–we tested
them again in a similar but more challenging paradigm, in which they could not see the objects
that Bimbo wanted.
In order to better evaluate whether orang-utan peers were able to comprehend (that is, re-
spond appropriately to) his points, even in the absence of prior knowledge, we designed a sim-
ple coordination game to be played between two individuals. A pair of studies was conducted.
In the first, Bimbo was observed interacting with each of five female orang-utans. In the sec-
ond, Bimbo and each of these females played the same game with a human experimenter.
Study 1
Materials and Methods
Participants. Participants in Study 1 were six orang-utans (Pongo pygmaeus) housed at
the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Centre at Leipzig zoo: Bimbo (32yrs), a flanged male;
four adult females: Pini (23yrs), Padana (14yrs), Kila (11yrs), and Dokana (22yrs); and a sub-
adult female (Raaja, 8yrs). Each of the adult females was tested in the company of a dependent
offspring who was too young to be separated from them. All subjects participated voluntarily,
and were rewarded for their participation with food. The food (a mixture of grapes, banana,
and dried banana pellets) was delivered on schedule, and in amounts determined in accordance
with their planned daily diet and approved by the zookeepers. Water was available ad libitum.
Ethics statement. In accordance with the recommendations of the Weatherall report ‘The
Use of Non-Human Primates in Research’ groups of apes were housed in semi-natural indoor
(230m2) and outdoor (1680m2) enclosures containing climbing structures, such as ropes and
platforms; and natural features, such as vegetation, trees and streams. Inside these enclosures
apes are fed daily at regular intervals, and eat a balanced diet consisting of fruit, vegetables, and
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plants, supplemented with small amounts of dairy, meat, and carbohydrates. The apes also
have access to enrichment devices including shaking boxes and poking bins, and are provided
with a further variety of difficult to open food packages through the day. They have access to
drinking water ad libitum. Subjects participated voluntarily in the study and were never food
or water deprived. Research was conducted in a dedicated observation room (4.65m x 5m x
3.2m) divided into a number of smaller testing facilities (see procedure for precise measure-
ments of the rooms used).
No medical, toxicological or neurobiological research of any kind is conducted at the
WKPRC. Research was non-invasive and strictly adhered to the legal requirements of Ger-
many. The study was ethically approved by an internal MPI-EVA committee, consisting of
zookeepers and academic research staff. Animal husbandry and research comply with the
‘EAZAMinimum Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquar-
ia’, the ‘WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and
Aquariums’ and the ‘Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research and
Teaching’ of the Association for the Study of Animal Behavior (ASAB). IRB approval was not
necessary because Germany requires no special permission for the use of animals in purely
behavioural or observational studies (TierSchGes §7 and §8).
Equipment and setup. Subjects were tested at the WKPRC in Leipzig, in a pair of adjacent
test rooms (2.3m x 2.95m x 3.2m; 2.75m x 2.95m x 3.2m) situated on either side of a 1.1m x
0.95m testing booth through which they could interact. A piece of apparatus designed for the
playing of a simple coordination game was placed in this testing booth (see Fig 1).
On one side of the apparatus (the side of the ‘donor’) were two opaque boxes with a trans-
parent front. These boxes, placed about 80cm apart, could be baited and locked. The contents
Fig 1. An Illustration of the Equipment Used in the Communication Game. The communicator on the left could see but not obtain the banana pellet
hidden in one of the black boxes. The donor on the right could release the food to the communicator, but could not see its location for herself. However, the
communicator could potentially indicate the location of the food by pointing through either the top or bottom row of holes on the opposite panel. A locking
mechanism prevented the donor from releasing more than one side per trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129726.g001
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of the two boxes could be seen by the subject sitting opposite them (the ‘communicator’), but
not by the donor. At the base of each box, a slide ran from the donor’s side of the booth, to the
communicator’s side. This slide allowed the donor to release material from either box to the
communicator, by pushing materials down on to the slides, causing them to roll to the opposite
side of the booth. The slides ended above receiving trays from which the communicator could
retrieve any donated objects.
To release material from the boxes, the donating individual needed to follow a two-step pro-
cess. The contents of each box could be released by sliding forwards a tray placed inside each
opaque box. This caused any material inside the box to drop onto the slide below. However, ac-
cess to these sliding trays first needed to be gained by moving aside a bar-lock that prevented
access to the trays. Sliding the bar-lock towards the centre of the panel both permitted access to
one box, and triggered a lock that prevented access to the other box until the mechanism had
been reset. Thus only one box could be released at a time.
The equipment was designed so that when food was hidden inside one of the boxes, it could
be seen but not reached by the communicator. The donor could not see the food but could re-
lease it to the communicator–providing that the communicator was able to indicate to her on
which side of the box the food had been hidden. If the donor understood the communicator’s
message–and if she felt inclined to respond pro-socially–the communicator could get the food.
The walls and panels separating the apes were made of glass and Perspex. Vocal and gestural
communication between the two was therefore possible. In particular, the Perspex panel oppo-
site the opaque boxes contained two rows of (6cm diameter) holes through which the commu-
nicator could point to the location of the food. One of the rows was placed at the same height
as the boxes containing the hidden food. A second row was placed at the same height as the re-
ceiving trays in which dropped objects landed. Each row contained three holes: on the left and
right (directly opposite both the boxes and the base of the chutes) and in the centre (see Fig 1).
Training. So that apes would understand the equipment, all were allowed to explore and
interact with it individually, in ten-minute training sessions in which an experimenter continu-
ally replenished food in the equipment. Test room doors were left open, so that individuals
could move freely between the test rooms on either side of the panel. When the equipment was
baited, apes could see where the food was hidden by entering the communicator’s room. Then,
by walking into the donor’s room, they could release this food themselves. All tested apes
learned how to use the equipment easily, and mastered its use within one session. Additionally,
after the conclusion of Study 1 all apes were retested on their understanding of the equipment
in a similar setup. All showed no hesitation in successfully retrieving food for themselves.
Procedure
Two orang-utans played the roles of communicator and donor. The communicator’s role was
always played by Bimbo. The donor’s role was played by one of five different females or—in a
control condition—by E1. Each female was tested in six sets of three trials, giving 18 trials per
female in total and 90 trials overall. E1 played the donor’s role in 30 trials.
Between each trial both ape participants would leave the test room while the equipment was
reset. Females were rewarded non-differentially, in the form of food (banana slices and banana
pellets) placed in the donor’s test room between each trial. Bimbo was allowed to eat whatever
food he could earn by pointing for his partner (females in the test condition; E1 in the control
condition). When points in successive trials were not met with successful responses, he was
also rewarded on an ad hoc basis between trials, to prevent him from becoming frustrated.
Between trials, one of the two opaque boxes was baited with a banana pellet. Sides were
baited in semi-random order (determined using a random number generator, with the same
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side being baited no more than twice consecutively). Following the baiting of one box, partici-
pants were released into the test rooms–first Bimbo on the communicator’s side, and then the
female subject on the donor’s side. Each trial lasted for three minutes, starting from the closing
of the entrance to the donor’s test room. During this period, interactions between participating
subjects were observed and filmed. The trial ended either when the donor (or her dependent
offspring) released the mechanism, or after three minutes had elapsed.
Control condition. The control condition, in which E1 assumed the role of donor, was
run prior to any set of three trials conducted between apes. The purpose of this condition was
twofold. First, it enabled us to compare the frequency and accuracy of Bimbo’s pointing for
human and non-human subjects. Second, it ensured that Bimbo received a steady supply of
food from E1, and remained motivated to engage with the testing in the face of any frustration
with female responses (or lack thereof).
In this condition, E1 responded to any points that Bimbo produced by immediately and
fully releasing the apparatus on the side to which he pointed, thereby rewarding him for
accurate points.
Scoring
Apes’ interactions were observed to see (1) whether (and with what accuracy) Bimbo would try
to indicate to the female (or to E1) the location of the hidden pellet, and (2) whether (and with
what accuracy) the females would respond to Bimbo’s gestures by releasing the food to him.
Bimbo was counted as producing a point when he inserted one of his fingers into the specially
made holes in the Perspex panel on his side of the apparatus. Only points produced after the
start of the trial were coded. A point was coded as accurate when it was made on the side of the
equipment consistent with the baited box, and irrespective of whether it was produced on the
upper or lower row of holes. If Bimbo pointed through than more than one hole at a time or
through the central hole, his point was coded as inaccurate.
For responses to points to be included in the dataset analysing comprehension, they had to
be (i) produced following a gesture that the donor could see, (ii) produced either during or
within 10s of the end of a point, and (iii) constitute a ‘full release’.
(i) Visible gestures. Since a pre-requisite of gesture comprehension is the recipient’s being
able to see her interlocutor’s gesture, our analyses of pointing comprehension included re-
sponses only if donors had been able to see Bimbo’s gestures when he pointed. Because apes’ at-
tention can be fleeting and is difficult to evaluate precisely, we coded this generously. Apes
were coded as unable to see a gesture only if they had their back turned to Bimbo for the whole
duration of the point. In the vast majority of cases, Bimbo pointed only when others could see
his points. In only four trials did he seem to produce ‘optimistic’ points, when subjects could
not see his points. In none of these cases was a response produced inside 10s.
(ii) 10s time limit. Female responses were counted only if they initiated a full release dur-
ing or within 10s of the end of a pointing episode. The 10s cut-off point was chosen in order to
ensure that subjects’ releasing the apparatus was a response to Bimbo’s points, and to ensure
that when individuals released after the end of Bimbo’s point, they were likely to remember the
target of his point. This rule was intended to exclude cases where individuals released the
equipment long after Bimbo had finished pointing (perhaps because they were bored or had
poor inhibition control), and where they no longer remembered the side to which he had
pointed. Responses made after 10s were therefore counted as ‘no response’. (This practice fol-
lows established procedures in gesture comprehension paradigms involving young children
[26] [27].) A total of 19 responses were made by apes within the 10s. (Had a more generous 20s
response time been adopted, only one more trial would have been included.)
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(iii) Full release. Female participants were counted as responding to Bimbo when they
both slid open the bar-lock and pushed forward a releasing tray (thereby potentially releasing
to him a pellet). The full release rule was introduced because when subjects (and particularly
dependent offspring) climbed on the equipment, they sometimes slid open the bar-lock inad-
vertently. Including the full release rule ensured that trials in which subjects did not make an
effort to release any pellet to Bimbo, by pushing forward the tray that (potentially) contained
the pellet, were not included as responses in the dataset. Where subjects released incompletely,
they were coded as having made ‘no response’ to a point. In Study 1, an adult subject (Padana)
performed an incomplete release on only one occasion.
Response and response accuracy. Where females released in full within 10s of the end of
a point, they were counted as having responded to that point. Additionally, these responses
were coded as either accurate or inaccurate. Responses were counted as accurate when the re-
cipient of the point slid open the gate on the side to which Bimbo pointed, and subsequently
pushed forward the receiving tray, causing the pellet to fall to him. In cases where the ape
pushed the correct tray but the pellet did not fall (for example, because it got stuck in the appa-
ratus), this was nonetheless counted as an accurate response (and Bimbo was rewarded with
the retrieved pellet). Responses were counted as inaccurate when the ape slid open and released
the mechanism on the side to which Bimbo had not pointed.
Releases by dependent offspring. While, in principle, dependent offspring could have re-
sponded to Bimbo’s points, in fact none produced any responses that satisfied criteria for inclu-
sion in the dataset.
Reliability coding
22% of all trials between apes (4 trials per ape subject) were coded by an independent coder,
who was ignorant of the hypotheses being tested. She was asked to code the following: (1) Did
Bimbo point (yes/no)? (2) Was his point accurate (yes/no/n/a)? (That is: did he point to the
side on which the pellet had been hidden?) (3) Was the intended recipient able to see his point
(yes/no/n/a)? (4) Did the subject respond within 10s (yes/no/n/a)? and (5) Was the subject’s re-
sponse accurate (yes/no/n/a)? (That is: did the donor release the equipment on the side to
which Bimbo had pointed?) Agreement was 100% (k = 1.00) in (1), (2) and (3) and 95% in (4)
(k = 0.93) and (5) (k = 0.91).
Additionally, 20% of trials in which Bimbo pointed for E1 were also subject to reliability
coding (6 trials in total). The coder was asked (1) whether or not Bimbo pointed for E1 (yes/
no), and (2) whether or not his points were accurate (yes/no). Agreement in both cases was
100%.
Dropped trials. One trial (out of 90) was dropped from the peer-peer condition in Study
1, because the subject was deemed to have been in the process of releasing the equipment be-
fore Bimbo pointed. As such, this release behaviour could neither be counted as a response to
Bimbo’s point, nor as ‘no response’. The final sample was therefore drawn from 89 trials. Addi-
tionally, one trial (out of 30) was dropped from the control condition, due to a failure of
recording equipment.
Results
Production. Bimbo pointed in 54% of trials for peers (over 89 trials), and in 100% of (29)
trials for E1. There was an effect of species on pointing likelihood within a trial (full-null model
comparison: χ2 = 17.27, df = 1, p =<0.001). Additionally, Bimbo pointed highly and equally
accurately for both species (94% accuracy with peers, and 93% for E1; Fisher’s exact test com-
paring accuracy across conditions, p = 1).
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Bimbo produced a second point in three trials, each time after his first point was ignored or
not seen. Since none of these further points elicited a response, these trials are counted only
once each in the analysis of comprehension data. The mean length of his points for females
was 14.1 seconds (median 9s; mode 9s; range 1-60s). Since E1 responded to Bimbo’s points im-
mediately, the duration of points produced in the control condition was not calculated.
A full account of production and responses in each trial can be found in the Supporting In-
formation file S1 Dataset.
Comprehension. Of the 48/89 trials in which Bimbo gestured for conspecifics, 30 elicited
no response from peers. Nonetheless, the vast majority of these points were produced when
they could be seen. Attention coding identified only 4/48 points as unlikely to have been seen
by subjects or their offspring. These ‘hopeful’ points were included in the dataset measuring
Bimbo’s production–but not in the dataset measuring females’ responsiveness and comprehen-
sion. Of the 19/44 points that elicited responses, 12 of these were accurate and the remaining 7
were inaccurate (see Fig 2 and Table 1 for distributions).
Fig 2. Accuracy of Responses to Bimbo’s Points by Females over 18 Trials.Where Bimbo’s points
could be seen by conspecifics, they received one of three possible responses: no response, an accurate
response, or an inaccurate response. No female responded inaccurately numerically more often than
accurately. However, due to the small sample-size, no statistical analysis is made.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129726.g002
Table 1. Study 1: Individuals’ Responsiveness to and Comprehension of Conspecific Points.
Individual Responses to Seen Points % Responsiveness Correct Responses Incorrect Responses % Response Accuracy
Raaja 5/6 83 4 1 80
Pini 8/10 80 4 4 50
Padana 5/9 56 3 2 60
Kila 1/9 11 1 0 100
Dokana 0/10 0 0 0 n/a
Combined 19/44 43 12 7 63
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129726.t001
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Due to the relatively small sample size, informative statistical analysis of comprehension
could not be run–since only Pini generated the six data points required to make statistical sig-
nificance using a binomial analysis possible, and since we lacked the minimum number of sub-
jects needed for a Wilcoxon signed rank test. Attempts to collect more data were thwarted
when Bimbo became frustrated with the test set-up, and refused to approach the coordination
apparatus in further trials.
While Pini, Padana, and Raaja responded to Bimbo on more than half of the occasions on
which he pointed, he was ignored by Kila and Dokana–giving an overall response rate of 43%.
No female responded with less than 50% accuracy.
Discussion
Bimbo pointed accurately for both orang-utan peers and for the human experimenter. Howev-
er, he pointed more often for the human experimenter than for his conspecifics. This is likely
to be because E1 was attentive and responsive in all trials. By contrast, orang-utans conspecifics
often spent little time at the apparatus, depriving Bimbo of the opportunity to point for them.
While three females (Pini, Padana, and Raaja) responded to over half of the (visible) points
that Bimbo produced for them, Kila and Dokana were almost totally unresponsive–meaning
that the overall response rate to Bimbo’s points was just 43%. This lack of responsiveness some-
times led Bimbo to display signs of frustration–including sulking, which he did by turning his
back on the apparatus and facing the wall, and (on one occasion) hitting out at the apparatus.
The low response rate here, combined with the low rate of production, compares poorly
with a recent pair of studies of peer-peer communication between chimpanzees [28] [29].
However, in both of these studies, the ape in the ‘donor’ role was held in a much smaller test
room, with fewer opportunities for distraction. This experimental setup likely facilitated com-
municative interaction between the conspecifics–because the lack of distractions in the donor’s
test room both made it easier for the communicator to gesture for the donor, and meant that
the donor had little better to do than attend to and respond to its peer’s gestures.
While statistical analysis of pointing comprehension across individuals was not possible due
to the small sample size, three of the four females who responded at all (Raaja, Padana and
Kila), responded accurately on numerically more occasions than they responded inaccurately,
and Pini responded correctly and incorrectly equally. The overall success rate of 63% is unspec-
tacular. However, it is consistent with meta-analyses of ape performance in other pointing
comprehension tasks (see [30]), which suggest that although apes do not excel at pointing com-
prehension, they tend to be right numerically more often than they are wrong. This suggests
that they are at least in some respects sensitive to the information being provided by
the pointer.
The ‘points’ that Bimbo produced differed in two respects from characteristically human
points. First, all of his gestures were produced on the bottom row of holes on the apparatus
(see Fig 1). In other words, he produced his gestures not by holding his hand at the same height
as the location of the hidden food, but by placing it at the location where any released food
would drop. This may be because when he sat on the floor, this gesture was more comfortable
for him. Arguably, though, his ‘points’ were not really points at all, so much as directed (and
thereby still referential) ‘begging’ gestures. Such gestures may have been more or less difficult
to comprehend than points produced opposite the hiding place of the food.
A second unusual feature of Bimbo’s gesturing was that, while humans and apes alike tend
to make direct, ‘ostensive’ eye contact with the intended recipients of their gestures [31],
Bimbo did not. Although he looked in the direction of females for whom he pointed, he typical-
ly did so with a somewhat averted gaze. While a human might also call out to their partner to
Referential Gestural Communication in Orang-Utans (Pongo pygmaeus)
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solicit their attention, Bimbo remained silent both while pointing and when his points were ig-
nored. This may have had two effects. First, since the use of ostensive gaze and name-calling
have been argued to facilitate the interpretation of communicative intentions in humans [32]
[33], Bimbo’s behaviour may have increased the chances of females responding to his points
inaccurately. Second, his failure to do more to solicit the attention of his interlocutors might
have made him comparatively easy to ignore, leading to lower response rates.
Study 2
In a follow-up study, we sought to further investigate the questions that remained open from
Study 1. First, we sought to gather more data about orang-utans’ ability to respond accurately
to points by having a human experimenter (E1) play the communicator’s role in every trial.
Second, in order to ascertain whether females’ performance in Study 1 could be attributed to
the idiosyncrasies of Bimbo’s behaviour, E1 produced points in three different conditions that
corresponded to and corrected for Bimbo’s behaviour in different ways.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Participants in Study 2 were the same as those in Study 1, although Bimbo
was now tested in the donor and not the communicator role. As before, each of the adult fe-
males was tested in the company of a dependent offspring. Only responses by adult female sub-
jects and Bimbo were included in the dataset. This is because E1’s calls were directed only to
these individuals; and because dependent offspring could not be tested systematically, since
their access to the testing apparatus was dependent on their caregiver’s tolerating their presence
at the apparatus. As before, all subjects participated voluntarily. They were rewarded non-dif-
ferentially for their participation, with food that was delivered on schedule, and water that was
available ad libitum. (For further details see the Ethics Statement above.)
Equipment and setup. The equipment and experimental setup in Study 2 were identical
to Study 1, with the exception that E1 now played the communicator’s role. Additionally, three
different styles of pointing were produced in different conditions, to see if this influenced
donor responsiveness and comprehension.
Condition 1: ostensive directed begging. Condition 1 was intended to resemble Bimbo’s
behaviour in the manner of the gestures that were used, but with a greater use of ‘ostensive’
communication–in the form of eye contact and name-calling. E1 produced his points in the
bottom row of holes, opposite the hidden pellet, in the manner that Bimbo had done. However,
he also retained ostensive eye contact–in the form of relaxed, friendly, direct gaze–with the
donor prior to and during pointing production, and he called the donor’s name every 1–3 sec-
onds during the same period (depending on their attention).
Condition 2: ostensive ‘human’ pointing. Condition 2 was intended to resemble typical
human pointing behaviour. As in condition 1, E1 made ostensive eye contact with the donor
prior to and during the production of the point, and called the donor’s name every 1–3 seconds
during the same period. However, this time E1 pointed via the top row of holes, opposite the
hidden pellet, in the manner that a human might typically do. In this condition, the receiving
tray openings were blocked with sliding doors, so as to rationalise E1’s failure to point in the
alternative locations.
Condition 3: reduced ostension directed begging. Condition 3 was intended to resemble
most closely the gestures produced by Bimbo in Study 1. As in condition 1, E1 produced his
pointing gesture in the bottom row of holes, opposite the hidden pellet. However, his gaze and
attention soliciting were now modelled on Bimbo’s behaviour. As such, E1 looked towards the
donor’s face with a slightly averted gaze, and remained silent throughout.
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Procedure
As in Study 1, apes were tested in sessions of three trials–alternating between conditions on dif-
ferent days. Sides were again baited in semi-random order (determined using a random num-
ber generator, and with the same side being baited no more than twice consecutively). Before
each trial, a small amount of food was placed on a shelf on the back of the equipment, in order
to give apes an incentive to approach the testing apparatus.
After apes were released into the donor’s test room, E1 produced pointing gestures and calls
in accordance with the condition. The experimenter endeavoured to produce points only when
orang-utan subjects were attentive–and ideally when they were standing or sitting at the base
of the apparatus, in order to feed. For this reason, the ‘visible gestures’ criterion adopted in
Study 1 was not used in our analyses of apes’ responses to E1’s points.
Points were held for approximately 15s each (mean 15.3s, median 16s, mode 16s, range 2-
55s). This figure was used to try to match the mean length of Bimbo’s points in Study 1. If no
response was forthcoming in 15 seconds, E1 again sought to gain apes’ attention, and subse-
quently produced a second point. In the ostensive conditions, he elicited apes’ attention by call-
ing their names and looking towards them. In the reduced ostension condition, gaining apes’
attention consisted only of waiting until they were momentarily attentive, while looking at
them with a slightly averted gaze. The trial ended either when the donor (or their offspring) re-
leased the mechanism, or 20 seconds after the end of E1’s second point, or after three minutes
had elapsed.
Scoring
Ape participants’ interactions were observed to see whether, and with what accuracy, they re-
sponded to E1’s points. Responses were counted as accurate only if the apes being tested re-
leased the mechanism in full, and in a timely manner, on the side to which E1 had pointed. As
in Study 1, for responses to be included in the dataset, they had to be produced within 10s of
the end of E1’s point, and for the mechanism to be released in full. While a total of 186 re-
sponses were made by apes within 10s, only 8 more responses would have been included if a
more relaxed 20s response time were adopted. We also retained the full release rule from Study
1, in order to exclude cases where apes partially released the mechanism while playing with or
climbing on the apparatus. In Study 2, incomplete releases from adult subjects were rare (oc-
curring on<10 occasions).
Releases by dependent offspring. For reasons described above, releases by dependent off-
spring were not included in the dataset for Study 2. Nonetheless, a record of these releases
(which occurred in 26 of 324 trials) was kept, and can be found in the Supporting Information
file S1 Dataset.
Reliability coding
In the second study, E1 pointed for ape subjects over 324 trials (18 trials per ape, per condi-
tion). 72 of these trials (22% of the total; 4 trials per ape, per condition) were second-coded by
an independent coder, who was ignorant of the hypotheses being tested. First, she was asked to
code whether apes had released the mechanism in full (by both sliding the lock and pushing
forward the tray) either during or within ten seconds of the end of E1’s point. Acceptable re-
sponses were ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The coders agreed in 96% of cases (k = 0.91). The coder was addi-
tionally asked whether the ape’s response was accurate (yes), inaccurate (no), or whether this
answer had no application (n/a–because no timely response was made). Here the independent
coders’ judgements coincided in 94% of cases (k = 0.92).
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Dropped trials. In ten trials (6 ‘successful’ and 4 ‘unsuccessful’ releases) subjects were
deemed to have been in the process of releasing the equipment at the time that E1 had initiated
a point. Since such cases could not be coded as either a response to E1’s point, or as ‘no re-
sponse’, they were dropped form the dataset. All ten of these cases were viewed and evaluated
by an independent second coder, who agreed that they met reasonable criteria for exclusion.
The final sample was therefore drawn from 314 trials.
Analyses
We tested whether orang-utans as a group responded to E1’s points more accurately than
would be predicted by chance, and whether any individual responded to these points more ac-
curately than would be predicted by chance. Additionally, we tested both whether (1) the likeli-
hood of an ape’s responding to E1’s point was predicted by condition, and (2) whether in trials
in which an ape did respond, the accuracy of the response was predicted by condition.
Results
Comparisons to chance. For both individuals and the group as a whole, we compared the
accuracy of their performance to chance. Group-level performance tended towards significance
(2-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test with a continuity correction applied, V = 20, p = 0.058).
However, this p value is approximate, since the existence of ties in the data mean that an exact
ranking of individual performance could not be completed.
We also tested individual comprehension against chance using binomial tests. Since there
was no effect of condition on performance (see following section), and to minimise issues of
multiple testing, the different conditions were collapsed within each subject. In this analysis,
only Pini (p = 0.014) was statistically above chance. Table 2 gives a list of p values per individu-
al. Fig 3 shows individual performance across conditions.
With the exception of Dokana, all individuals responded to E1’s points on at least 50% of
trials (collapsed across conditions). While overall the accuracy of apes’ performance tended to-
wards significance (p = 0.058), only Pini responded to these points with greater accuracy than
would be predicted by chance (p = 0.014). (For full details of individual performance see the
Supporting Information file S1 Dataset.)
Full-null model comparisons. To test whether there was an effect of condition on either
(1) the likelihood of apes responding to points, or (2) the accuracy of their responses, we ran
Generalised Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) with binomial error structure comparing full and
null models [34]. (Given the binary nature of the accuracy response, a GLMM is better
equipped than an ANOVA to analyse the non-normally distributed data [35].) In both com-
parisons the same predictor variables were used. The full model comprised ostension, height of
point, trial, and sex and age as fixed effects. Additionally, we included the random effect of
Table 2. Study 2: Individuals’ Responsiveness to and Comprehension of E1’s Points.
Individual Total Responses % Responsiveness Correct Responses Incorrect Responses % Response Accuracy Performance
Raaja 28/53 53 16 12 57 0.572
Pini 38/49 78 27 11 71 0.014*
Padana 49/54 91 27 22 55 0.568
Kila 29/50 58 14 15 48 1
Dokana 2/54 4 2 0 100 0.5
Bimbo 38/54 70 21 17 55 0.627
Combined 184/314 59 107 77 58 0.058**
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129726.t002
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subject and random slopes of trial, ostension, and height of point within subject, to allow the
effect of these predictors to differ between subjects. The model comprising these predictors was
compared to a null model lacking ostension and point height.
In the model comparing likelihood of response, there was no effect of condition upon likeli-
hood (χ2 (1, N = 314) = 3.48, p = 0.18). In the model comparing accuracy of response, which was
drawn from a reduced dataset consisting only of trials in which apes responded, there was also
no significant difference between the full and null models (χ2 (2, N = 184) = 0.97, p = 0.62). That
is, there was no effect of condition upon either the frequency or the accuracy of apes’ responses.
For both of the models we assessed assumptions of absence of multi-collinearity by calculat-
ing variance inflation factors (VIFs), using the vif function of the R-Package. The maximum
VIF for the model testing whether or not apes responded to the point was 2.322, indicating no
evidence of collinearity. The maximum VIF for the model testing response accuracy was 3.065,
showing no strong evidence of collinearity.
We also checked for model stability by excluding female subjects one by one from the data
set and rerunning the models to check for variation in the estimates. In the model testing
whether or not subjects’ tendency to respond was predicted by condition, Dokana was found to
be potentially influential with respect to sex and age. Given her non-participation, this is not
surprising. However, with respect to the predictor variables of interest, the model was stable
(that is, since she was equally unresponsive across conditions, her contribution did not alter
our findings). In the model testing accuracy of response as a function of condition, Padana’s
contribution was found to be potentially influential. However, since the full-null comparison
remained non-significant even when she was removed from the dataset, the interpretation of
our results was not undermined.
Fig 3. Study 2: Comprehension of E1’s Points in Three Conditions (18 Trials per Condition). No effect of condition was found on either frequency or
accuracy of responses. While only Pini was above chance in responding accurately to E1’s points (p = 0.014), the group’s overall performance approached
significance (p = 0.058).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129726.g003
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We also tested to see if participants’ performance changed over time. We controlled for the
possibility that individuals’ performance changed differently over time by including the ran-
dom slope of trial within the random effect of subject. As before, we tested both the likelihood
of their responding, and the accuracy of their responses. We did this by comparing full models
comprising trial number, sex, and age as fixed effects. (Given the absence of any effect of condi-
tion, trial number was collapsed across conditions–giving a total of 54 trials per subject.) The
model comprising these predictors was compared to a null model lacking trial number and the
random slope of trial within subject. In the model testing responsiveness as an effect of trial,
there was a significant difference between the full and null models (χ2 (2, N = 314) = 9.279,
p = 0.010). To find out the nature of this effect, we created a reduced model without the ran-
dom slope and compared this to the full model. There was no significant difference between
these models (χ2 = 0, df = 1, p = 0.999), suggesting that the effect did not differ between individ-
uals. A new reduced model dropping the fixed effect was subsequently compared with the full
model. This was significant (χ2 = 5.749, DF = 1, p = 0.017), suggesting that there was an overall
effect of trial. The effect was negative: as the test progressed, the likelihood of subjects’
responding decreased.
In the model testing accuracy of response over time, we created–as before–a reduced dataset
consisting only of trials where apes responded (N = 184 trials). We then compared the full and
null models previously described. In this comparison, there was no difference between full and
null models (χ2 = 0.182, DF = 2, p = 0.913), indicating that the accuracy of apes’ responses did
not change over trials.
As before, we assessed assumptions of absence of multi-collinearity by calculating variance
inflation factors of these models. The maximum VIF for the model testing change in respon-
siveness over trials was 2.321, indicating no evidence of collinearity. The maximum VIF for the
model testing whether or not apes’ responses changed in accuracy over trial was 3.050, showing
no strong evidence of collinearity. We also checked for model stability. In the model testing re-
sponsiveness, with respect to the feature of responsiveness the model was highly stable. In the
model testing accuracy of response, the model was also found to be stable.
Discussion
As a group, orang-utans’ comprehension performance tended towards significance. Nonethe-
less, individual performance was unexceptional: only Pini performed above chance in the accu-
racy of her responses to E1’s points.
Overall there was no effect of condition on either the frequency with which apes responded
to E1’s points, or the accuracy with which they did so. That is, neither the level of ostension nor
the height of E1’s points played a significant role in either the frequency or accuracy with
which apes responded. Furthermore, while apes’ responsiveness decreased as the number of tri-
als increased, the accuracy of their responses did not change. That is: they lost interest in the
study over time, but their responses became neither more nor less accurate.
The small effect of comprehension across subjects is comparable to what has been observed
in other studies (see [30]). The finding that only one ape was successful at responding accurate-
ly to points is also in line with previous findings, which show that apes are generally unexcep-
tional although not totally lacking in pointing comprehension ability.
Why exactly individuals performed unspectacularly is difficult to diagnose. In particular, we
cannot state with certainty that the individuals could not make the required inferences about
E1’s communicative goals. Another possibility is that the apes understood E1’s points but were
not motivated to respond to them since–by doing so–they would be rewarding E1 with food
that they would not themselves get.
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Since responding accurately and inaccurately were equally costly options–because apes’ per-
formance was non-differentially rewarded–apes did not stand to lose out by releasing accurate-
ly. Furthermore, since apes were not more likely to release incorrectly, and since their tendency
to release inaccurately did not increase as the number of trials increased (which might be pre-
dicted if they did comprehend E1’s points, but grew frustrated by their lack of reward), there is
no evidence that apes grasped E1’s communicative goal, but chose to respond spitefully. None-
theless, it may be that apes’ performance was undermined by their lack of motivation to reward
E1, given that they did not stand to benefit from doing so themselves; and that with greater mo-
tivation (in the form of differential food rewards), their performance would have improved.
Given the general lack of accurate responses in all individuals beside Pini, the lack of an ef-
fect of condition should also be interpreted somewhat cautiously. For example, the findings do
not show that orang-utans are insensitive to ostensive cues. In an easier task, perhaps using a
gesture that apes find easier to interpret–like a begging gesture–the presence or absence of os-
tensive cues might still lead apes to respond to a gesture in different ways.
Some have hypothesised that in humans [33] [36] (and also in domesticated dogs [37]) sen-
sitivity to ostensive cues represents an adaptation that alerts individuals to the fact that they are
being addressed with communicative intent. However, particularly in this experimental setup,
there is no reason to doubt that apes were generally receptive to the fact that E1 was acting with
communicative intent, since (with the exception of Dokana) all were generally responsive and
willing to release food to the experimenter. Moreover, given that the apes were generally famil-
iar with similar test-situations, and that in such situations human experimenters often attempt
to communicate with them, it’s possible that even in the non-ostensive condition, familiarity
with similar test set-ups lead apes to expect communication. In similar experimental set-ups
human children are also willing to attribute communicative intentions even in the absence of
ostensive cues [26] [27].
General Discussion
In a previous study [25], Pelé and colleagues found that (1) the orang-utans at Leipzig zoo–and
Bimbo especially–pointed spontaneously for conspecifics to request tokens, and (2) that these
conspecifics responded appropriately to points by accurately handing over the requested to-
kens. Study 1 confirms the first finding of the previous study: Bimbo pointed spontaneously
and regularly for both humans and orang-utans in order to request food. Moreover, he used
his point referentially–by directing it accurately to the particular location of the item that he
desired. However, his gestures were somewhat different from human points–in that they were
produced both less ostensively and lower down than human points might be.
The findings of Study 2 only partially reproduce the earlier finding that orang-utans under-
stand requestive points. Despite previous findings [25], this finding is perhaps not surprising
given that apes’ are typically unexceptional at pointing comprehension; and given the greater
difficulty of the task reported here. The fact that Bimbo produced points nonetheless can be ex-
plained on the grounds that pointing production is cognitively less demanding than pointing
comprehension. This is because in pointing comprehension the recipient has to infer her inter-
locutor’s communicative goal, based on the actions that the interlocutor performs. Since the
producer of a point does not have to infer her own communicative goals, pointing production
is easier [3]. At the same time, we would suggest that both the overall performance in Study 2,
and Pini’s individual performance, shows that pointing comprehension in this task was not to-
tally outside the ken of orang-utans. It may be that with greater practice, or more substantial
motivation, performance would have improved.
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It may be that orang-utans’ comprehension performance in both studies was facilitated by
the fact that points were produced closer to the location of hidden food than to the alternative
location. As such, these points provided spatial cues to the location of the food. This is not a
weakness of the study, though; rather it points to a fundamental mechanism by which pointing
gestures work–namely by making salient particular features of an environment. In order to co-
ordinate successfully, the donor still needed to infer that the communicator’s gesture was being
produced because he (either Bimbo or E1) wanted the contents of the nearby container. Had
respondents not made this inference, their releasing behaviour would remain unexplained.
The fact that orang-utans performed well in the Pelé at al. paradigm [25] but less well here
can be explained in a number of different ways. A first reason is that in this study the pointer’s
point was (necessarily) produced much further from its referent than in the previous study,
since participants interacted across a1m wide testing booth rather than on either side of a
thin mesh fence. This could potentially make the referent of a point harder to discern. Howev-
er, the presence of the slides in our setup–which ran from the location of the point to the hiding
place of the pellet–served as a visual aid to inferring the target of that point. The side to which
the point was directed was therefore particularly salient.
A more likely explanation is that what made our task harder was the difficulty of the infer-
ence that was required for successful comprehension of the point. In the Pelé at al. study recipi-
ents of the point could themselves see what it was to which the pointer was pointing; and,
moreover, they had prior experience of the pointer’s preference for the object to which Bimbo
was pointing. Contexts like this are pervasive in human communication. However, they make
for communicative interactions that are comparatively easy to interpret [3]. By contrast, in our
paradigm the intended referent of the point could not be seen. Rather, apes had to infer the
presence of the target from previous experience of the paradigm, and from the pointer’s ges-
ture. Furthermore, they could not use the visual presence of the referent as information in in-
terpreting the possible content of the speaker’s message. Since it was not visually available to
them, its presence could not serve to remind them of the prior preference of the pointing indi-
vidual. As a result, in this task they needed to both suppose that the pointer was pointing to a
pellet that they could not see, and to infer that this point was being produced because the point-
er desired the unseen object, and was requesting it. Given these ways in which our task was
more difficult than the one tested by Pelé et al. [25], it’s unsurprising that–in line with our orig-
inal prediction–orang-utans should perform better in the earlier study than they did here.
If this is right, the difficulty that apes had in the paradigm tested here, contrasted with their
relative success in the earlier paradigm [25], might also tell us something valuable about the
limitations on orang-utans’ ability to comprehend pointing. With the caution that is appropri-
ate for comparing data from two quite different studies, we might therefore interpret the data
as revealing valuable insights about the origins of pointing comprehension in phylogeny.
It is has been hypothesised that the ability of our ancestors to point to objects, and for the re-
cipients of points to interpret them, may have been a turning pointing in early hominin evolu-
tion. Such interactions would have enabled groups of individuals to coordinate their actions
with respect to triangulated objects. Once we recognise that pointing comprehension can re-
quire inferences of different difficulty, we can suppose that some points may have occurred ear-
lier in phylogeny than others. In particular, one possibility is that pointing for visually available
objects appeared earlier in phylogeny than pointing for visually unavailable objects.
The first points produced by our early hominin ancestors may have been produced in rela-
tively intimate interactions. It is already known, for example, that young apes of all species beg
for food from the mouths and hands of dominant and older conspecifics [38]. It is a short step
from here to imagine cases in which, in order to avoid confrontation, such individuals might
also beg for food that was not held by the dominant individual but on the ground in his or her
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vicinity, and within that individual’s reach and line of sight. Here gestures would perhaps no
longer take the form of hands extended towards the individual, but of hands outstretch towards
a triangulated referent–perhaps in conjunction with gaze alternation between the addressee
and the desired target. Thus, our early points might have more closely resembled referential
begging gestures–like the ones produced by Bimbo–than the points that we commonly produce
today. This suggestion is consistent with evidence that apes typically produce points for objects
that are closer to them (but still unobtainable), while human infants also point for distal objects
[18]; and it is consistent with reports that chimpanzees sometimes ‘point’ to the visible parts of
their bodies that they would like conspecifics to groom [12] [39]. Other similar gestures are
also present in the chimpanzee repertoire–as when, for example, they extend their hand to-
wards a dominant individual in order to recruit support in a conflict situation, while alternat-
ing gaze between the aggressor and the individual whom they hope to recruit [40] [41].
Our ancestors’ ability to use points to coordinate their activities with respect to distal and
unseen objects, and perhaps objects the significance of which was less evident to their intended
audience, plausibly emerged only later in phylogeny, after they had mastered the use of points
in more intimate, and easily interpreted interactions. This hypothesis should be tested in future
research, by comparing great apes’ comprehension of points in circumstances of
varying difficulty.
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